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Abstract
We study the strategic behavior of voters in a model of proportional representation, in which the
policy space is multidimensional. Our main nding is that in large electorate, under some assumptions
on voterspreferences, voters essentially vote, in any equilibrium, only for the extreme parties.
Keywords: Strategic Voting, Proportional Rule, Nash Equilibrium.
JEL Classication: C72, D72.
1 Introduction
In this short paper we examine the equilibria of a spatial model of proportional representation, in which
the policy space is multidimensional and the policy outcome is a linear combination of partiespositions
weighted by the share of votes each party gets in the election. The understanding of such issues is a
fundamental step in order to study the relation between strategic voting and the number of parties resulting
at equilibrium, as well as the relation between strategic voting and the position of the parties voters decide
to vote for.
In a recent paper (De Sinopoli and Iannantuoni, 2003) we analyze a similar model of proportional
representation, in which the policy space is unidimensional. The main result is that, if voterspreferences
are single peaked, essentially an unique Nash equilibrium exists, characterized by the fact that any voter
on the left/right of the corresponding policy outcome votes for the leftmost/rightmost party. The incentive
to vote for an extreme is given by the maximal e¤ect that such a vote has on the outcome.
In this paper, we show how this result extends to a multidimensional policy space. If we assume that
the policy space is the unit square and there are parties located at the four corners, it is unambiguous that
these parties are the extreme ones. In this political scenario, we prove that, if voterspreferences are single
peaked in each dimension with the peak independent from the other dimension, only the extreme parties
take a relevant amount of votes. Hence, under the above assumptions, the extreme result holds also when
strategic voters face a two-dimensional policy space. However, a simple example shows that the assumption
of strict quasi-concavity of the utility function, which is the natural extension of single-peakedness to the
multidimensional case, is not su¢ cient to obtain the result that only the extreme parties get votes.
The hypothesis that four parties located at the corners exist can be relaxed, at the cost of dealing with
a specic utility function. We study the case in which each voter has a loss function given by a weighted
sum of each issues distance from his preferred policy. In this circumstance, we demonstrate that only
parties located on the boundary of the convex hull of partiespositions take a relevant amount of votes.
We emphasize that, even if all the results are proven assuming a two-dimensional policy space, the
extensions to more than two dimensions are straightforward.
Before proceeding to the model, let us mention that Schoed and Sened (2002) present a model of
multi-party spatial competition under proportional rule. Their main result, supported also by an empirical
analysis to the Israeli politics, shows that the centre is empty in politics.
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We describe the model in the next Section, and, then, we study strategic voting when the four parties
located at corners exist in Section 3, while in Section 4 we analyze the case in which each voter has a loss
function given by a weighted sum of each issues distance from his preferred policy. Section 5 concludes
the paper. An appendix contains most of the proofs.
2 The Model
Policy Space. The policy space X is a rectangle and without loss of generality we assume X = [0; 1]2 :
Parties. Parties are xed both in number and in their positions, in that there is no strategic role for
them: there is an exogenously given set of parties M = f1; :::; k; :::mg, indexed by k. Each party k is
characterized by a policy k = (k1; k2) 2 X.
Proportional Rule. Given the set of parties M , each voter can cast his vote for any party.1 The pure
strategy space of each player i is Si = f1; :::; k; :::;mg where each k 2 Si is a vector of m components with
all zeros except for a one in position k, which represents the vote for party k.
A mixed strategy of player i is a vector i = (1i ; :::
k
i ; :::; 
m
i ) where each 
k
i represents the probability
that player i votes for party k:
The policy outcome. The policy outcome is a linear combination of partiespolicies each coe¢ cient
being equal to the corresponding share of votes.2 Given a pure strategy combination s = (s1; s2; :::; sn),
v(s) = 1n
P
i si is the vector representing for each party its share of votes, hence the policy outcome can be
written as:
X (s) =
mX
k=1
kvk (s) : (1)
Voters. Each voter i is characterized by a bliss point i 2  = 1  2 = [0; 1]2. We assume that it
exists a fundamental utility function (à la Harsanyi) u : <4 ! <, representing the preferences, which is
ui(X) = u(X; i). In other words, a player is fully characterized by his bliss point.
Given the set of parties and the utility function u, a nite game   is characterized by a set of players
N = f1; :::; i; :::; ng and their bliss points. Given  , let F1(1) and F2 (2) be the marginal distributions of
playersbliss points on 1 and 2, that is to say F1(1) is the proportion of voters i with i1  1, and
F2 (2) is the proportion of voters i with i2  2.
The utility that player i gets under the strategy combination s is:
Ui(s) = u(X(s); i)
Given a mixed strategy combination  = (1; :::; n), because players make their choice independently
from each other, the probability that s = (s1; s2; :::; sn) occurs is:
(s) =
Y
i2N
sii :
The expected utility that player i gets under the mixed strategy combination  is:
Ui() =
X
(s)Ui(s):
In the following, as usual, we shall write  = ( i; i), where  i = (1; :::i 1; i+1; :::n) denotes the
(n  1) tuple of strategies of the players other than i. Furthermore, si will denote the mixed strategy i
1 In this model we do not allow for abstention. We cannot claim that this assumption is neutral. In our proof we use the
fact that, as the number of players goes to innity, the weight of each player goes to zero, and this does not hold when a large
number of voters abstains.
2Note that, if politicians have a loss function that is quadratic, our outcome function is the utilitarian solution of a
bargaining process among them. Hence it is the result of a bargaining process of government formation à la Baron and
Diermeier (2001), under the assumption that the statu quo is quite negative for parliamentary members. This is a weak
assumption if the statu quo is given by new election where parliamentary members face the risk of not being reelected, and
the cost of staying out of the legislature is su¢ ciently large, as in Austen-Smith and Banks (1988).
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that gives probability one to the pure strategy si. Given a mixed strategy combination ,  will denote the
averagestrategy, i.e.  =
P
i2N
i
n ; and, with abuse of notation, X() the corresponding outcome, that is
X() =
mP
k=1
kk:
3 Parties at the corners of the square
In this section, we study the equilibria of the model when there are four parties located at the four corners
of the policy space and voterspreferences are single peaked in X1(resp. X2) with the peak independent
from X2(resp. X1). The two assumptions can be formulated as:
Assumption 1: The four extremist parties LB; LT; RB; RT with LB = (0; 0); LT = (0; 1); RB = (1; 0);
RT = (1; 1) exist.
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Assumption 2:
8X2; i: X1 < X 01  i1 or i1  X
0
1 < X1 implies u(X1; X2; i) < u(X
0
1; X2; i)
8X1; i: X2 < X 02  i2 or i2  X
0
2 < X2 implies u(X1; X2; i) < u(X1; X

2; i):
We rst state a trivial result for pure strategies. Every pure strategy equilibrium is such that, except
for voters located in a small subset of the policy space, whose area is inversely related to the number of
players, voters vote only for the extreme parties.
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, let s be a pure strategy equilibrium of the game   with n
voters, then
() if i  X (s)  ~1n then si = LB;
() if i  X (s) + ~1n then si = RT ;
() if i1  X1 (s)  1n and i2  X2 (s) + 1n then si = LT ;
() if i1  X1 (s) + 1n and i2  X2 (s)  1n then si = RB.
Proof. () First notice that if i  X (s i; LB), then by Assumption 2 voting for LB is the only best
reply for player i against s i. Because X(s i; LB) = X(s)  1nsi  X(s) 
~1
n , then i  X(s) 
~1
n implies
that LB is the unique best reply, for player i, to s i. () () () A symmetric argument holds.
3.1 On the need of Assumption 2
In De Sinopoli and Iannantuoni (2003) we have shown that single-peakedness of voterspreferences is the
only assumption needed to prove that almost any voter, in any pure strategy equilibrium, votes only for
the two extremist parties. Hence, it is quite natural to check if Assumption 2 can be relaxed by simply
assuming that the votersutility functions are strictly quasi-concave, that is the natural extension of single-
peakedness when the policy space is multidimensional. At this end, let us consider the following example
with ve parties, the four extremists LB; LT; RB; RT (as described in Assumption 1) and the center C
with c = (
1
2 ;
1
2 ):
The strictly quasi-concave utility function of voter i, characterized by the bliss point i = (i1; i2), is:
u (X; i) =  
0@ 2X
j=1
(Xj   ij)2
1A  10
s
i2   1
2

X1 +
1
2
(i1   i2) 

i1   1
2

X2
2
:
Voters are located in four regions (see gure 1) on  = [0; 1]2:
3This Assumption could be weakened, at the cost of a much heavier notation, by simply requiring that the convex hull of
partiesposition is a rectangle, with the sides parallel to the axis.
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A =

1  min

3
2
2   1
4
;
5
4
  3
2
2;
1
2

;
B =

1  max

3
2
2   1
4
;
5
4
  3
2
2;
1
2

;
C =

2  min

3
2
1   1
4
;
5
4
  3
2
1;
1
2

;
D =

2  max

3
2
1   1
4
;
5
4
  3
2
1;
1
2

:
It takes few calculations to check that, independently from the number of voters, everybody voting for
C is a Nash Equilibrium of the game.
We show that for a player i located in region A and with i2  12 (see gure 2), voting for the center is
a best reply to everybody voting for the center. By symmetry, it will follow that everybody voting for the
center is a Nash equilibrium of the game. Let C i be the strategy combination given by everybody except
player i voting for C.
If player i votes for C the policy outcome is (X1; X2) =
 
1
2 ;
1
2

, hence
u ((C i; C) ; i) =  
 
1
2   i1
2     12   i22 :
If player i votes for LB the policy outcome is (X1; X2) =
 
1
2   12n ; 12   12n

, hence
u ((C i; LB) ; i) =
    12   12n   i12     12   12n   i22   10q i2   12   12   12n+ 12 (i1   i2)   i1   12   12   12n2:
If player i votes for LT the policy outcome is (X1; X2) =
 
1
2   12n ; 12 + 12n

, hence
u ((C i; LT ) ; i) =
    12   12n   i12     12 + 12n   i22  
  10
q 
i2   12
  
1
2   12n

+ 12 (i1   i2) 
 
i1   12
  
1
2 +
1
2n
2
:
If player i votes RB the policy outcome is (X1; X2) =
 
1
2 +
1
2n ;
1
2   12n

, hence
u ((C i; RB) ; i) =
    12 + 12n   i12     12   12n   i22   10q i2   12   12 + 12n+ 12 (i1   i2)   i1   12   12   12n2:
If player i votes RT the policy outcome is (X1; X2) =
 
1
2 +
1
2n ;
1
2 +
1
2n

, hence
u ((C i; RT ) ; i) =
    12 + 12n   i12     12 + 12n   i22   10q i2   12   12 + 12n+ 12 (i1   i2)   i1   12   12 + 12n2:
The rst easy observation is that voting LB is a better reply than voting for any other extremist party4 .
Hence if u ((C i; C) ; i)  u ((C i; LB) ; i) voting for C is a best reply for player i.
It is easy to calculate that
u ((C i; C) ; i)   u ((C i; LB) ; i) = 1n

1
4n   1  4i1 + 6i2

, which is strictly positive since i 2 A
(i.e. i1  32i2   14 ).
By symmetry, everybody voting for C is a Nash equilibrium (independently from the number of the
players), and, hence, the assumption of strictly quasi-concavity of the utility function does not imply that
voters vote only for the parties located at the corners.
4For example, u ((C i; LB) ; i)  u ((C i; LT ) ; i) = 6n (1  2i2) that is non-negative for i2  12 .
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3.2 Mixed strategy equilibria
In this section we analyze mixed strategy equilibria. To carry on such analysis we assume that the utility
function is continuously di¤erentiable respect to the policy.5
Assumption 3: The fundamental utility function u : <4 ! < is continuously di¤erentiable with
respect to the policy.6
In view of the result of Proposition 1, it is natural to analyze the policy outcome obtained when anybody
strictly to the left-bottom of it votes for LB, anybody strictly to the left-top votes for LT and so on.
At this end, let   =

 1 ; 
 
2

be the unique xed point of the correspondence H : !  dened by:7
H1() =
"
1  F1(1); lim
y! 1
1  F1(1)
#
H2() =
"
1  F2(2); lim
y! 2
1  F2(2)
#
:
In the appendix we will prove the following results:
Proposition 2 Under assumptions 1, 2 and 3, 8 > 0, 9n0 such that 8n  n0 if  is a Nash equilibrium
of a game   with n voters, then:
() if i      ~ then i = LB;
() if i    + ~ then i = RT ;
() if i1   1    and i2   2 +  then i = LT ;
() if i1   1 +  and i2   2    then i = RB:
The above proposition replicates and extends the result previously obtained for pure strategy equilibria.
It replicates the previous result in the sense that every equilibrium is such that, except for voters located
in a small subset of the policy space, whose area is inversely related to the number of players, voters vote
only for the extreme parties. It extends it, because it shows that every equilibrium conforms to the same
cutpoint :
4 A specic utility function
In the previous section we have made a very strong political assumption, that is four parties located at
the corners of the policy space exist. In the following, we will drop Assumption 1, at the cost to deal with
a specic utility function, which corresponds to a loss function equal to a weighted sum of each issues
distance from the preferred policy:
Assumption 4: The fundamental utility function u : <4 ! < is:
u (X; i) =   (i) ji1  X1j   ji2  X2j
where  (i) : [0; 1]
2 ! <++ is a continuous function.
Also in this case, for large electorate, an extremeresult holds. In the appendix, we will prove:
5To study mixed strategies equilibria some cardinal assumptions on the utility function are needed. Because we use the
mean value theorem, the cardinal assumption we have made is the di¤erentiability one. Furthermore, the continuity of @u(X;)
@X1
and @u(X;)
@X2
in X guarantees the existence, for each player, of a lower bound on the number of players for which the results
hold. The continuity of the above derivatives in  assures that a bound can be found independently from the set of players.
6With assumption 2, this implies that 8X2; 8i @u(X;i)@X1 R 0 if X1 Q i1 as well as 8X1; 8i
@u(X;i)
@X2
R 0 if X2 Q i2.
7Obviously,   exists, by the Kakutanis xed point theorem, and is unique, because 8j = 1; 2
0j > j =) maxHj(0)  minHj():
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Proposition 3 Under Assumption 4, 8" > 0, 9n0 such that 8n  n0 if  is a Nash equilibrium of a game
  with n voters, then:
() if i  X () ~" and c =2argmin
k2M
[ (i) k1 + k2] then 
c
i = 0;
() if i  X () +~" and c =2argmax
k2M
[ (i) k1 + k2] then 
c
i = 0;
() if i1  X1 ()  " , i2  X2 () + " and c =2argmin
k2M
[ (i) k1   k2] then ci = 0;
() if i1  X1 () + " , i2  X2 ()  " and c =2argmax
k2M
[ (i) k1   k2] then ci = 0:
The above Proposition shows that, for large electorate, parties that are not located on the boundary of
the convex hull of partiespositions will not take a relevant amount of votes.
5 Conclusion
In this short paper we have studied strategic voting under proportional representation, when the policy
space is multidimensional. We prove that, when four parties located at the corners of the policy space
exist, if voterspreferences are single-peaked in each dimension with the peak independent from the other
dimension, and if the utility function is continuously di¤erentiable with respect to the policy, there exist a
cutpointpolicy such that any equilibrium conforms to such a cutpoint, that is to say almost everybody
located on the left-bottom of the cutpoint votes for the left-bottom corner and so on. Because the assump-
tion that there are four parties located at the corners is quite strong, we drop it, at the cost to deal with a
specic utility function. If the preferences are represented by a loss function that is a weighted sum of each
issues distance from the players bliss policy, in any equilibrium, only parties located on the boundary of
the convex hull of partiespositions take a relevant amount of votes.
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Appendix: Proofs of Proposition 2 and 3
Given a mixed strategy j ; the player js vote is a random vector8 ~sj with Pr (~sj = k) = kj . Given
 i = (1; :::i 1; i+1; :::n); let ~s i = 1n 1
P
j2N=i
~sj and  i = 1n 1
P
j2N=i
j . The following Lemma will
be useful to prove both Propositions:
Lemma 4 8 > 0 and 8 > 0; if n > m
42
+ 1; then 8;8i
Pr
~s i    i  ~ > 1  :
Proof. To prove the lemma we can use Chebyshevs inequality component by component. Given
 i, it is easy to verify that E(~sjk) = kj and V ar(~sjk) = 
k
j (1   kj )  14 ; hence E(~s ik ) =  ik and
V ar(~s ik )  14(n 1) . By Chebyshevs inequality we know that 8k;8:
Pr
 ~s ik    ik  >   14(n  1)2 :
Hence
Pr
~s i    i  ~  1 X
k
Pr
 ~s ik    ik  >   1  m4(n  1)2 ;
which is strictly greater than 1   for n > m
42
+ 1:
Proof of Proposition 2.
The rst step of the proof consists in showing:
Lemma 5 Under Assumptions 1-3, 8" > 0, 9nLB0 such that 8n  nLB0 , if the game has n voters and if
i  X () ~", then LB is the only best reply for player i to  i.
Proof. Fix " > 0: Dene, 8 2 0; 1  "22 ;
M"1 () = max
(X1;X2)2[+ "2 ;1]
2
@u(X; )
@X1
:
By Assumption 2 we know that M"1 () < 0: Moreover, given the continuity of
@u(X;)
@X1
; we can apply the
theorem of the maximum to deduce that the function M"1 () is continuous, hence it has a maximum on
0; 1  "2
2
, which is strictly negative. Let
M"1 = max
2[0;1  "2 ]
2
M"1 () :
Dene analogously M"2: Let M

" = max fM"1;M"2g, and c¯=mink2M=fLBg fk1 + k2g. Let
M1 and M2
denote, respectively, the upper bound9 of
@u(X;)@X1  and of @u(X;)@X2  on X, M = max M1; M2	and let
" =
 M" c¯
2 M M" c¯
and  = (
 2+p6)"
m . We prove that if n >
m
42"
+ 1, then LB is the only best reply for
player i, which, setting nLB0 equal to the smallest integer strictly greater than
m
42"
+ 1, directly implies
the claim.
Take a party c 6= LB. We will show that n > m
42"
+ 1 implies
Ui ( i; c)  Ui ( i; LB) < 0
and, hence, c 6= LB is not a best reply for player i.
Ui ( i; c)  Ui ( i; LB) =
X
s i2S i
 (s i)

u

X (s i; c)  1
n
(c   LB); i

  u (X (s i; c) ; i)

.
8We remind readers that a vote is a vector with m components.
9The continuity of @u(X;)
@X1
and @u(X;)
@X2
assures that these bounds exist.
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Because the outcome function X (s) depends only upon v(s), denoting with V  i the set of all vectors
representing the share of votes obtained by each party with (n 1) voters, the right-hand side of the above
expression can be written as:X
v i2V  i
Pr(~s i = v i)

u

X
 
v i; c
  1
n
(c   LB); i

  u  X  v i; c ; i
where, with abuse of notation, X
 
v i; c

= cn +
n 1
n
mP
k=1
kv
 i
k .
By the mean value theorem we know that 8v i,
9Xbelonging to the line joining X  v i; c  1nc and X  v i; c such that
u
 
X
 
v i; c

; i
  u  X  v i; c  1n (c   LB); i
1
n
=
@u(X; i)
@X1
c1 +
@u(X; i)
@X2
c2:
Hence we have:
Ui ( i; c) Ui ( i; LB) = 1
n
X
v i2V  i
Pr(~s i = v i)

u
 
X
 
v i; c

; i
  u  X  v i; c  1n (c   LB); i
1
n
 1
n
Pr(
~s i    i  ~) [Mn1(; i1)c1 +Mn2(; i2)c2] + 2n (1  Pr(~s ik    i  ~)) M
where
Mn1(
; i1) = max
(X1;X2)2[X( i ~;c)  1n c;1]
2
@u(X; i)
@X1
Mn2(
; i2) = max
(X1;X2)2[X( i ~;c)  1n c;1]
2
@u(X; i)
@X2
:
Now we prove that, for n > m
42"
+ 1; Mn1(
; i1) M" as well as Mn2(; i2) M" .
We show that Mn1(
; i1)  M" , the other one being completely analogous. From the denition of M" ,
it su¢ ces to prove that Mn1(
; i1) M"1, which is true if X1( i  ~

; c)  1nc1 is greater than i1+ "2 ,
and X2( i   ~

; c)  1nc2 is greater than i2 + "2 . We only prove the inequality for the rst coordinate,
the proof for the second coordinate being similar.
X1( i   ~

; c)  1
n
c1 =
n  1
n
X
k
 ik k1  
n  1
n
X
k
k1 =
X1()  1
n
X
k
ki k1  
n  1
n
X
k
k1 > X1() 
1
n
 m  i1 + "  1
n
 m:
Hence, this step of the proof is concluded by noticing that " is by denition less than
1
2 , hence
10
i1 + "  1
n
 m > i1 + " m   2
2
m
= i1 + "  (20  8
p
6)"2
m3
  "

 2 +
p
6


i1 + "(1  (20  8
p
6)
8
+ 2 
p
6) = i1 +
1
2
":
By Lemma 4, we know that, for n > m
42"
+ 1;
Pr(
~s i    i  ~) [Mn1(; i1)c1 +Mn2(; i2)c2] + 2(1  Pr(~s i    i  ~)) M <
10 In the following we assume that "  1, since otherwise the proposition is trivially true.
8
(1  ")M" c¯ + 2

"M = (1 
 M" c¯
2M  M" c¯
)M" c¯
+ 2
 M" c¯
2M  M" c¯
M = 0;
which concludes the proof.
A symmetric argument proves:
Lemma 6 Under Assumptions 1-3, 8" > 0;9nRT0 ; nLT0 ; nRB0 such that:
() 8n  nRT0 , if the game has n voters and if i  X () +~", then RT is the only best reply for player i
to  i.
() 8n  nLT0 , if the game has n voters and if i1  X1 ()  ", and i2  X2 () + ", then LT is the only
best reply for player i to  i.
() 8n  nRB0 , if the game has n voters and if i1  X1 () + ", and i2  X2 ()  ", then RB is the only
best reply for player i to  i:
Combining the result of the following Lemma, we obtain Proposition 2
Lemma 7 Under Assumptions 1-3, 8 > 0, 9n0 such that 8n  n0 if  is a Nash equilibrium of a game
  with n voters, then:
() if i1   1    then i 2 fLB;LTg
() if i1   1 +  then i 2 fRB;RTg
() if i2   2    then i 2 fLB;RBg
() if i2   2 +  then i 2 fLT;RTg.
Proof. We only prove () and () because the proof of () and () is completely similar. Fix  and,
in Lemmas 5 and 6, take " = 2 and let n0 be the greater number among the corresponding n
LB
0 ; n
RT
0 ; n
LT
0 ;
and nRB0 . It is easy to see that if n  n0 and  is a Nash equilibrium of  ,  1   2  X1 ()   1 + 2 .
Suppose by contradiction that  1   2 > X1 () ; then Lemma 6 implies that all voters i with i1   1 vote
either for RB or for RT and hence  1  X1 (), contradicting  1   2 > X1 (). Analogously for the second
inequality. Hence  1     X1 ()  2 and  1     X1 () + 2 , which with Lemmas 5 and 6 complete the
proof.

Proof of Proposition 3: We rst prove the following Lemma:
Lemma 8 Under Assumption 4, 8" > 0, 9nLB0 such that 8n  nLB0 , if the game has n voters,  is a Nash
equilibrium, i  X () ~", and c =2argmin
k2M
[ (i) k1 + k2] then 
c
i = 0.
Proof. Fix " > 0. Take a party lb 2argmin
k2M
[ (i) k1 + k2]. Dene, for k =2argmin
k2M
[ (i) k1 + k2],
Dk (i) = [ (i) lb1 + lb2    (i) k1   k2]
Dene alsoD (i) = max
k=2arg min
k2M
[(i)k1+k2]
Dk (i), as well asD = max
i
D (i). ClearlyD is strictly negative.
Let  = max

 (),  =  D1+ D ; and 
 = ( 2+2
p
2)"
m . Clearly 
 and  are strictly positive.
Now we prove that if n > m
42 + 1, then 8c =2argmink2M [ (i) k1 + k2]:
Ui ( i; c)  Ui ( i; lb) < 0
which, setting nLB0 as the smallest integer greater or equal to
m
42 + 1, implies the claim.
As in the proof of Lemma 5,
Ui ( i; c)  Ui ( i; lb) =
X
v i2V  i
Pr(~s i = v i)

u
 
X
 
v i; c

; i
  u  X  v i; lb ; i :
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Notice that, if 
i1  min fX1 (s i; c) ; X1 (s i; lb)g
i2  min fX2 (s i; c) ; X2 (s i; lb)g
then
u (X (s i; c) ; i)  u (X (s i; lb) ; i) = 1
n
[ (i) lb1 + lb2    (i) c1   c2] =
1
n
Dc (i) .
Moreover,
max
s i;c
ju (X (s i; c) ; i)  u (X (s i; lb) ; i)j  1
n
[ (i) + 1] .
Obviously,X1

s i;~0

 min fX1 (s i; c) ; X1 (s i; lb)g, as well asX2

s i;~0

 min fX2 (s i; c) ; X2 (s i; lb)g.11
From Lemma 4 we know, for n > m
42+1, that Pr
~s i    i  ~ > 1 . Because, for n > m
42+1,
X

 i   ;~0

> X () ~"  i12 , we can deduce:
u (X ( i; c) ; i)  u (X ( i; lb) ; i) =
X
v i2V  i
Pr(
 
~s
 i
= v i)

u
 
X
 
v i; c

; i
  u  X  v i; lb ; i <
1
n
[(1  )D + (1 + )] = 1
n

(1   D
1 +   D )D +
 D
1 +   D (1 + 
)

= 0
and, hence, c =2argmin
k2M
[ (i) k1 + k2] cannot be a best reply for player i.
Analogously, the following Lemma can be proved:
Lemma 9 Under Assumption 4, 8" > 0, 9nRT0 ; nLT0 ; nRB0 such that
() 8n  nRT0 , if the game has n voters,  is a Nash equilibrium, i  X () +~", and
c =2argmax
k2M
[ (i) k1 + k2] then 
c
i = 0.
() 8n  nLT0 , if the game has n voters,  is a Nash equilibrium, i1  X1 ()  ", i2  X2 () + ", and
c =2argmin
k2M
[ (i) k1   k2] then ci = 0.
() 8n  nRB0 , if the game has n voters,  is a Nash equilibrium, i1  X1 () + ", i2  X2 ()  ", and
c =2argmax
k2M
[ (i) k1   k2] then ci = 0.
Setting n0 = max

nLB0 ; n
RT
0 ; n
LT
0 ; n
RB
0
	
completes the proof. 
11With abuse of notation X

s i;~0

denotes the outcome that would have been resulted if a party in (0; 0) existed and
player i voted for it.
12We only prove the inequality for the rst coordinate because the proof for the second coordinate is completely analogous.
X1(
 i   ~;~0) = X1()  1
n
X
k
ki k1  
n  1
n
X
k
k1 > X1() 
1
n
 m:
This step of the proof is concluded by noticing that " is by denition less than
1
2
, hence
X1()  1
n
 m > X1() m   2
2
m
= X1()  ( 2 + 2
p
2)"  24  16
p
2
m3
"2 > X1()  ":
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Figure 1: x = 1; y = 2:
Figure 2: x = 1; y = 2:
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